COORDINATION DEPARTMENT

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    Sb(III) Fluoride Complexes with DL-Valine. Crystal Structureof Molecular Complex SbF3{(CH3)2CHCH(+NH3)COO–}
    ( 2004) L. A. Zemnukhova, R. L. Davidovich, A. A. Udovenko, and E. V. Kovaleva
    Preparative method in combination with X-ray diffraction and IR spectroscopy is used to studyreaction of Sb(III) fluoride with α-aminoisovaleric acid (DL-valine) in an aqueous solution in the range of themolar ratios of components (0.25–2) : 1 in the presence of hydrofluoric acid. The molecular complex of Sb(III)fluoride with valine (1 : 1) of the composition SbF3{(CH3)2CHCH(+NH3)COO–} (I) and valinium tetrafluoro-antimonate(III) monohydrate {(CH3)2CHCH(+NH3)COOH}SbF4 · H2O (II) are synthesized for the first time.Crystal structure was determined for the molecular complex I consisting of SbF3 groups and valine moleculesunited into polymer chains through bidentate bridging carboxylate groups of amino acid molecules.
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    Coordination
    (Researchgate, 2006) Martin Haspelmath
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    Coordination in the El Farol Bar Problem: The Roleof Social Preferences and Social Networks
    (conomics-ejournal, 2013) Shu-Heng Chen and Umberto Gostoli
    In this paper, the authors continue the pursuit of the self-coordination mechanism as studied in theEl Farol Bar problem. However, in addition to efficiency (the optimal use of the public facility), theyare also interested in the distribution of the public resources among all agents. Hence, they introducea two-dimensional El Farol Bar problem, to be distinguished from the early one-dimensional one,which has efficiency as the only concern. The authors ask whether it is possible to have self-coordinating solutions to the El Farol Bar problem so that the public resources can be optimallyused with neither idle capacity nor incurring congestion and, in the meantime, the resources can bewell distributed among all agents. They consider this ideal situation an El Farol version of a "goodsociety". This paper shows the existence of a positive answer to this inquiry, but it requires twoelements, which were largely left out in the conventional literature on the El Farol Bar problem.These elements are social networks and social preferences. The authors first show, through cellularautomata, that social networks can contribute to the emergence of a "good society". They then showthat the addition of some inequity-averse agents can even guarantee the emergence of the "goodsociety".JEL B52 C63 C73Keywords El Farol Bar problem; social preferences; social networks; inequity aversion,cellular automataAuthorsShu-Heng Chen, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, [email protected] Gostoli, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan
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    COORDINATIONANDCOORDINATIONVARIABILITYINTRAILRUNNING
    (Department of Sport and Exercise Science, University of Salzburg, 5400 Hallein-Rif, Austria, 2 Adidas AG, 91074 Herzogenaurach, Germany, 2023) Matteo Genitrini ; Julian Fritz ; Hermann Schwameder